FEDERAL FUSION FORCE

Federal Fusion Force

(Time to think and unite)

Logo   designed by me for this dream project.....A blue thunder destroying a red sickle

                 The great battle of ‘Kurukshethra’ ended with victory of ‘Pandavas’ on the eighteenth day when Duryodhan was mortally wounded by Bheem in a fierce single combat with mace at Samanthapanchaka, a holy spot at Kurukshethra.   Aswathama, Krutavarma and Krupacharya were the only three survivors in the ‘Kaurava’ side. They met Duryodhan who was in a pool of blood and swore to him that they will kill all the Pandavas by any probable means. Duryodhana from his death bed made Aswathama the Commander-in Chief of the ‘Kaurava’ force.

               A very disturbed and restless Aswathama was seated sleepless under a huge banyan tree that night where he observed an owl attacking a crow’s nest and destroyed his prey to shreds. Learned the truth of nature, Aswathama, in a ruthless ambush, attacked the Pandava camp at midnight when everybody was asleep after a day long war. . Those who tried to flee from Aswathama’s wrath were hacked to death by Kripacharya and Krithavarma who placed themselves at the camp’s entrance. Rest is history- except Pandava brothers; the whole Pandava army was killed that night. The lesson Aswathama learned from that owl, was that, under the nature, a person can fight when he is strong. Can it be considered as the first guerilla camp attack in the history of conventional or sub conventional warfare? I wish my limited wisdom could fetch some more information about it.

                 Another camp attack had taken place centuries later at ‘Sardar Post’ on Gujarat border when a brigade level Pakistan Army mounted an attack on a CRPF post on April 9, 1965.  Brave soldiers of CRPF valiantly repulsed the attack at night gunning down 34 of Pakistani soldiers. To commemorate the battle of “Sardar Post” the Central Reserve Police Force celebrates this day, the 9th April as “valour Day”. Today being that auspicious day let us salute those valiant men who had sacrificed their lives at the call of duty in that battle.

                          Now let us come to the present. As of late, several such attacks on CRPF camps are being reported too often. But this time it’s not the Pakistani forces but our own countrymen disgruntled and damaged in the name of some antiquated ideology.  

First Action- Then Negotiation.

                So much has been said and wrote about the grave threat the naxalites are posing to our country. It is largely accepted that, the burgeoning naxalite threat is no more a law and order problem and is in fact a very complex social state of affairs and hence eradicating Naxalism from its roots is not seems to be their piece of cake as far as state police machinery is concerned. Notwithstanding some progress made with respect to suppressing the movement in Andhra Pradesh by political resurrections in the naxal affected areas blended with some coordinated police action, there have been no significant triumphs the affected states could claim in this regard.

                  Inequality in social and economical status is going to be there for long in India due to its democratic structure and it's vast diversity. Be it in terms of cast, religion or regional characteristics, any concrete solution to the social agitation elevated by the naxalites in the name of such disparity is not visible in any near horizon. “Win over the people” slogan by the intellectuals and human rights activists seems to be a forbidden task while considering stiff opposition by the Maoist themselves against any such move by the government. By propping up this issue, Naxalites have been wreaking havoc in the states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Orissa and several other states in our country.  A consensual way towards reconciliation through a political settlement is by no means acceptable to the Maoist hardliners. Thus, in the wake of recent escalation in Maoists attack on security forces as well as on government establishments, it is imperative for us to act and act firmly towards finding a solution to this menacing issue which can grow as a demon.

.                 As widely believed in the so called intellectual circuit, Naxalism is no more an ideology rooted in socioeconomic disparities or a struggle of an alienated class. It is rather a movement that has grown steadily in the vast tracts of rural India and evolved gradually into extremism in urban centres too with obvious intention to overthrow the established authority of the government through armed rebellion. Even though it is universally accepted that no insurgency can be won over militarily, a political solution to this problem is possible only when the Maoist also desires so. In the present scenario they do not want a political solution as they genuinely believe that they are in a state of dictating terms at least in some places where they think they are impregnable. Their top leaders view far into the future setting their target of an armed rebellion achieved in 25 to 50 years. As long as they are on wining spree and deem themselves out of harm's way at their hideouts, they will never assent to negotiate.  They scrupulously believe that they can over run a security camp at their will and ambush the security forces where they think the troops least expect such an attack. Since Naxalism is far more wide spread to be called an intra-state insurgency, effective dealing could only be carried out by the central government as the state governments have become passive spectators who failed miserably to crackdown on Maoists. In a system where, even the postings of senior police officers are decided inside the party offices, a clear plan of action and its impeccable execution is near impossible until and unless a strong political will is exhibited by the state government. As the state governments have been completely neutralized in the areas where naxals are having sufficient hold, it has become inevitable for central government to think seriously about imposing 'Disturbed Areas Act'  and 'Armed Forces Special Power Act' with immediate effect in those states.  No political considerations are to be taken into account as vote bank requirements should never be considered above human lives. Separate judicial system even at the cost of major judicial reforms should be established for speedy trial for the cases related to Naxalism. Large scale massacre as we have seen at Chintalnar, Lalgarh, Koraput, Gadchiroli etc are simply a strategy of terror. Their ideology that, the ‘manner of killing should frighten more than the killing itself’, is indeed contrary to their image as saviors of poor and downtrodden.

Clear and Clean

                        In the present security scenario, our strategy of “Clear, Hold and Build” in naxal affected areas is in itself time consuming and impractical. Our strategy, in plain words should be “Clear and Clean”.   Here we have to be very solid and tangible about the word clean. It is not just about eradicating the armed naxalites but also to clean the minds of our tribal population which is now highly debauched by the negative propaganda of Maoists. The decisions are there to be taken and to be taken in appropriate time. We may not discuss here the social, economic or cultural problems prevalent in these areas or other such issues like development, poverty eradication or empowerment as they are being constantly discussed among the political as well as administrative circles for quite long.

                        With a dream of “Red flag in Red fort” by 2025, naxalites are working in close coordination with some terrorist outfits operating in J&K even though no concrete evidence of any such memorandum of understanding has come out in the open. In the wake of such reckless agendas our hostile neighbors hold discreetly, we should take resolute actions with immediate effect before things get out of our hands. And very importantly, it should be time bounded and result oriented.

               Since the ultimate objective of Maoist and the package of the government for negotiation are in fact contradictory, let us now talk in the language which they better understand. Substantive talks on a permanent solution to this problem between government and Maoist are possible only when they potentially think that they are getable. Let us first understand specifically that, the issues which the government addressed as a solution to the ongoing naxal menace is not at all in any way correlate with the agendas of the naxalites, which according to the government is in fact a strike at the very root of our nation. There can not be a soft approach to a problem which directly affects the existence of a democratic system. General perception among the common man in India is that, left wing extremism is an issue between security forces and Maoists and hence they are not much worried over the developments in the naxal affected areas. Whereas sympathy towards the security forces fighting against naxalites heightened particularly after the massacre in Chintalnar and Gadchiroli.

                   Let us take the example of SLAF action against LTTE in Srilanka in a different perspective.  Terrorism prevailed in the north-eastern province of that country has been completely wiped out, at least for the time being, in an unprecedented military action.  They were forced to initiate such an action, literally when they came across a situation where the very existence of that country was endangered. LTTE was in fact allowed to grow larger than the boots by domestic as well as international negotiations for long. Whereas the militants utilized the peace time for procuring arms from external agencies and thereby strengthen their combat preparedness. But ultimately all the concerns about human right violations and other social, economic and cultural agendas are sorted out by an all out military action. Nobody said anything except few paltry politicians here and there. Do we need to head towards the same state of affairs prevailed in Srilanka is the question of the hour. Do we need to wait till Maoists buildup an Air force squadron or UAV’s?  LWE in the other hand has not developed to a stage as LTTE were. They are now in a mobile war fare phase but hold a clear agenda of strengthening their military power prior to a shift to conventional war. In the wake of recent intelligence reports, clearly establishing the links between ISI and LWE, such a possibility could not be ruled out in distant future. Their pyramidal organizational structure similar to LTTE makes them a formidable unit for attaining the same in long term perspective.

                  No fast developing nation can afford to deal with a problem with an uncertain solution for long. Hindrances are to be removed quickly to ensure the rapid development. By telling this, I shall never advocate mass killings of tribal population or even harming their faith on our democracy. What iam intended to say is to rescue them from the clutches of misdemeanors. Maoists should be told that they are vulnerable to our strikes which will coerce them to the negotiation table in the wake of their increasing boldness in carrying out attack against the union of India.

Federal  Fusion Force  (Need of the hour)

                   Several setbacks incurred by the Central Paramilitary Forces from the hands of Maoist are mainly due to the territorial and dialectal disadvantage they face in hostile areas. Incredibly vast expanse of forest land has made conquering them a daunting task for a few units of Para-Military forces and other state armed forces.  Reports that security personnel in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand are wary of venturing into jungles has obvious reasons. As a matter of fact, field commanders of the CPMFs and their counterparts in the state police machinery often differs in strategies and tactics. I don’t want to generalize the issue.  But the ground reality is that, the mistrust and differences are prevalent among them in almost all states where massive central Para-Military forces are deployed. Both agencies think it’s more comfortable to carry out operations independently. A discussion on the reasons for such mistrust would be a farce exercise as we all are well verse with it. But this lack of coordination among the central and state security forces is one such serious factor affecting our plan to eradicate Naxalism from our country. Allegations and counter allegations against each other add fuel to this intricate issue. Despite of several instructions from the Home ministry, exchange of intelligence inputs among the forces are not effectively forthcoming due to obvious reasons. It’s according to me a “saas-bahu syndrome” which is difficult to subside. Due to inadequate motivation and lack of training, state police forces choose themselves to act as a supporting cast to the central forces although it is agreed upon that the paramilitary forces are there to assist the state police. By virtue of their familiarity with the topography and also the local dialect, state police personnel are in a better shape to fight Left wing extremists in their respective territories. Intricate political arrangements in many states often act as a major hindrance to the successful implementation of the strategies aimed to the eradication of naxalism.  Red tapism is more prevalent in the states where administration is largely being influenced by the party offices.  . Since the main problem lies with the whole system, an amicable solution to curb the menace of red-terrorism is not seems to be immediately possible. Hence it becomes pertinent to think about those options which are practical and implemental.

                  Let us now seriously think about a deputation organization in the likes of NSG or the much successful Grey Hounds to fight Maoists in their territory with an equal involvement of central paramilitary forces and state police force.  No need to talk about the latest gadgets, communication system or armory.  Special emphasis should be given in selecting only the young and intelligent personal from both forces apposite for clandestine jungle operations. The task force thus constituted should be autonomous and armed with special powers to arrest and detain, aided with enhanced infrastructural facilities and should be well paid. They should operate from peace areas and return back to their stations for cooling before setting out for another operation.

              Since we already have the well trained and extremely robust CoBRA units with high motivation and energy, let us feed them with what they lack. Let us think about inserting a fixed percentage of state police personnel, including dynamic IPS officers who have determined understanding about the subject from each naxal affected states on deputation basis to CoBRA and restructure the CoBRA units as a deputation force under the direct control of Home Ministry or Cabinet secretariat.  Let us not shy away from accepting the facts, at least for the better interest of the nation that, as of now the operations are being done by some, whereas the intelligence inputs are being kept with someone else. Such a pity!  My suggestion is, if needed the parliament may enact a law in this regard which will dissuade unnecessary influences from political leaders as well as other external agencies. All operations against LWE should be conducted by this special federal force based on actionable intelligence and by using numerous armed force camps in the forest as their rendezvous points.

                 Evaluation and dissemination of important information is not a subject which can be handled by layperson. A meticulous intelligence setup including trained IB officers should be deputed to the force with an extensive surveillance mechanism including aerial surveillance system and imaging technology. They will coordinate with their counterparts in IB for effective ground support.    Exchange of information and effective verification needs a satellite based integrated network providing direct communication from one station to other. Assistance from the ISRO and Air force is important as they are much needed catalyst for conflict resolution.  Utilization of Air Force shall be limited to ‘air power’ but not ‘air strikes’ as it will result in huge civilian causalities which would in later course prompt more people joining the insurgent groups which will aggravate the problem. What I try to say is the need of a pinpoint resolute action targeting the armed insurgents only. Air assistance will also act as a huge morale booster for the ground troops as it will forewarn them and guide them in hot pursuits.

              The force should track the movements of members of central military commission; divisional commanders, guerrilla squads etc to carry out targeted liquidation of them acted upon by meticulous intelligence input. They should cutoff the smuggling routes by arresting suspected suppliers of ration and other logistics to Maoists. Striking at their communication centers and armory by making use of thermal images and other sophisticated gadgets would add to their tasks. 

             Other CRPF contingents which are deployed in the highly infested areas will give adequate ground support by laying outer and inner cordons to maintain pressure tactics on the insurgents so that they will be forced to fight from their weakness. They may also concentrate on civic action programmes and other propaganda tactics by highlighting the in-humanitarian standards and atrocities of Maoists. Likewise they can collect a lot of intelligence from the local informers who will give it without fear once they are taken into confidence. They will act as a close nit grid for special operations of the Federal Fusion Force. They will also act as a protective cover to the government machinery in carrying out developmental works in the remote tribal areas in long run once the Naxalism is wiped out and will take care of the damage control works and civic action.

Conclusion

                       A soft approach towards the LWE with good governance and civic action programmes are not just the sole solution to this issue. Maoists use such action by the government to declare it as their success in forcing the government to resolve the issues with their propaganda skills. Impoverished tribal would believe that. Targeted liquidation of armed cadres will disintegrate this menace.  Differences apart, let us tackle the common enemy with iron fist by fusing topographical advantage of the state police and the man power strength of the central police. Let us unite and fight. Let the enemy do not take the advantage of our division. No more lives of security personnel should be sacrificed and not a single attack on security installation be allowed. Life of each security personnel is precious

         This is just a suggestion that has cropped up in my limited wisdom whereupon reading a lot of news regarding operational failures from the part of security forces due to the lack of intelligence inputs. As a person who among the first to intrude into the liberated zones of Maoist territory by commanding a CRPF company during 2006 and thereby played an active role in establishing the largest Salwa Judam Camp in one of the most vulnerable areas of Dantewade district, Dornapal, my  own field experiences have also contributed a bit in making this article. 

I fully understand that there are many things, political and constitutional, to be addressed before enacting a federal striking force in our country. This is with an intention to share something that has been in my mind since long to my peers in this field for your suggestions and opinions, particularly from those who have a different view on this which Iam sure will improve my grey cells.    …. “Jai Hind”